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The Resource Page: Focus on U.S. v. Microsoft
In the Winter 2001 Court Review, we
reprinted excerpts of the appellate briefs in
U.S. v. Microsoft concerning the trial judge’s
media interviews about the case. On June
28, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit unanimously concluded that the
judge’s conduct was improper. As we suggested in the preceding issue, while the
Microsoft case may be unique, the incidence
of judges having at least some contact with
reporters is not. Thus, we believe the court’s
decision in the Microsoft case on this issue
will be of widespread interest. The citations
to the judge’s media interviews, have been
omitted; citations to those interviews can be
found in the briefs excerpted in the Winter
2001 issue. In our next issue, William G.
Ross, a law professor at the Cumberland
School of Law at Samford University in
Birmingham, Alabama, whose article on
extrajudicial speech was cited by the
Microsoft court, will provide some overall
guidance for judges on dealing with both the
ethical rules discussed here and the media.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee v.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
Appellant.

No. 00-5212,
Consolidated with 00-5213
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
Argued: February 27, 2001
Decided: June 28, 2001
Reported at: 253 F. 3d 34.
Per Curiam: Microsoft Corporation
appeals from judgments of the District
Court finding the company in violation of
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and ordering various remedies. . . . .
[253 F.3d at 107]
VI. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges requires federal
judges to “avoid public comment on the
merits of [] pending or impending” cases.

Canon 2 tells judges to “avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities,” on the bench and off. Canon
3A(4) forbids judges to initiate or consider
ex parte communications on the merits of
pending or impending proceedings.
Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code
requires judges to recuse themselves when
their “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
All indications are that the District
Judge violated each of these ethical precepts by talking about the case with
reporters. The violations were deliberate,
repeated, egregious, and flagrant. The only
serious question is what consequences
should follow. Microsoft urges us to disqualify the District Judge, vacate the judgment in its entirety and toss out the findings of fact, and remand for a new trial
before a different District Judge. At the
other extreme, plaintiffs ask us to do nothing. We agree with neither position.
A. The District Judge’s Communications
with the Press
Immediately after the District Judge
entered final judgment on June 7, 2000,
accounts of interviews with him began
appearing in the press. Some of the interviews were held after he entered final
judgment. The District Judge also aired his
views about the case to larger audiences,
giving [253 F.3d at 108] speeches at a college and at an antitrust seminar.
From the published accounts, it is
apparent that the Judge also had been giving secret interviews to select reporters
before entering final judgment—in some
instances long before. The earliest interviews we know of began in September
1999, shortly after the parties finished presenting evidence but two months before
the court issued its Findings of Fact.
Interviews with reporters from the New
York Times and Ken Auletta, another
reporter who later wrote a book on the
Microsoft case, continued throughout late
1999 and the first half of 2000, during
which time the Judge issued his Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Judgment. The Judge “embargoed” these
interviews; that is, he insisted that the fact

and content of the interviews remain
secret until he issued the Final Judgment.
Before we recount the statements
attributed to the District Judge, we need to
say a few words about the state of the
record. All we have are the published
accounts and what the reporters say the
Judge said. Those accounts were not
admitted in evidence. They may be
hearsay.
We are of course concerned about
granting a request to disqualify a federal
judge when the material supporting it has
not been admitted in evidence.
Disqualification is never taken lightly. In
the wrong hands, a disqualification
motion is a procedural weapon to harass
opponents and delay proceedings. If supported only by rumor, speculation, or
innuendo, it is also a means to tarnish the
reputation of a federal judge.
But the circumstances of this case are
most unusual. By placing an embargo on
the interviews, the District Judge ensured
that the full extent of his actions would
not be revealed until this case was on
appeal. Plaintiffs, in defending the judgment, do not dispute the statements attributed to him in the press; they do not
request an evidentiary hearing; and they
do not argue that Microsoft should have
filed a motion in the District Court before
raising the matter on appeal. At oral argument, plaintiffs all but conceded that the
Judge violated ethical restrictions by discussing the case in public: “On behalf of
the governments, I have no brief to defend
the District Judge’s decision to discuss this
case publicly while it was pending on
appeal, and I have no brief to defend the
judge’s decision to discuss the case with
reporters while the trial was proceeding,
even given the embargo on any reporting
concerning those conversations until after
the trial.” 02/27/01 Ct. Appeals Tr. at 326.
We must consider too that the federal
disqualification provisions reflect a strong
federal policy to preserve the actual and
apparent impartiality of the federal judiciary. Judicial misconduct may implicate
that policy regardless of the means by
which it is disclosed to the public. [253
F.3d at 109] Also, in our analysis of the
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arguments presented by the parties, the
specifics of particular conversations are
less important than their cumulative
effect.
For these reasons we have decided to
adjudicate Microsoft’s disqualification
request notwithstanding the state of the
record. The same reasons also warrant a
departure from our usual practice of
declining to address issues raised for the
first time on appeal . . . . We will assume
the truth of the press accounts and not
send the case back for an evidentiary hearing on this subject. We reach no judgment
on whether the details of the interviews
were accurately recounted.
The published accounts indicate that
the District Judge discussed numerous
topics relating to the case. Among them
was his distaste for the defense of technological integration—one of the central
issues in the lawsuit. In September 1999,
two months before his Findings of Fact
and six months before his Conclusions of
Law, and in remarks that were kept secret
until after the Final Judgment, the Judge
told reporters from the New York Times
that he questioned Microsoft’s integration
of a web browser into Windows. Stating
that he was “not a fan of integration,” he
drew an analogy to a 35-millimeter camera
with an integrated light meter that in his
view should also be offered separately:
“You like the convenience of having a light
meter built in, integrated, so all you have
to do is press a button to get a reading. But
do you think camera makers should also
serve photographers who want to use a
separate light meter, so they can hold it
up, move it around?” In other remarks,
the Judge commented on the integration
at the heart of the case: “It was quite clear
to me that the motive of Microsoft in
bundling the Internet browser was not one
of consumer convenience. The evidence
that this was done for the consumer was
not credible . . . . The evidence was so
compelling that there was an ulterior
motive.” As for tying law in general, he
criticized this court’s ruling in the consent
decree case, saying it “was wrongheaded
on several counts” and would exempt the
software industry from the antitrust laws.
Reports of the interviews have the
District Judge describing Microsoft’s conduct, with particular emphasis on what he
regarded as the company’s prevarication,
hubris, and impenitence. In some of his
secret meetings with reporters, the Judge
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offered his contemporaneous impressions
of testimony. He permitted at least one
reporter to see an entry concerning Bill
Gates in his “oversized green notebook.”
He also provided numerous after-the-fact
credibility assessments. He told reporters
that Bill Gates’ “testimony is inherently
without credibility” and “if you can’t
believe this guy, who else can you
believe?” As for the company’s other witnesses, the Judge is reported as saying that
there [253 F.3d at 110] “were times when
I became impatient with Microsoft witnesses who were giving speeches.” “They
were telling me things I just flatly could
not credit.” In an interview given the day
he entered the break-up order, he summed
things up: “Falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus”: “Untrue in one thing, untrue in
everything.” “I don’t subscribe to that as
absolutely true. But it does lead one to suspicion. It’s a universal human experience.
If someone lies to you once, how much
else can you credit as the truth?”
According to reporter Auletta, the
District Judge told him in private that, “I
thought they [Microsoft and its executives] didn’t think they were regarded as
adult members of the community. I
thought they would learn.” The Judge told
a college audience that “Bill Gates is an
ingenious engineer, but I don’t think he is
that adept at business ethics. He has not
yet come to realise things he did (when
Microsoft was smaller) he should not have
done when he became a monopoly.”
Characterizing Gates’ and his company’s
“crime” as hubris, the Judge stated that “if
I were able to propose a remedy of my
devising, I’d require Mr. Gates to write a
book report” on Napoleon Bonaparte,
“because I think [Gates] has a Napoleonic
concept of himself and his company, an
arrogance that derives from power and
unalloyed success, with no leavening hard
experience, no reverses.” The Judge
apparently became, in Auletta’s words,
“increasingly troubled by what he learned
about Bill Gates and couldn’t get out of his
mind the group picture he had seen of Bill
Gates and Paul Allen and their shaggyhaired first employees at Microsoft.” The
reporter wrote that the Judge said he saw
in the picture “a smart-mouthed young
kid who has extraordinary ability and
needs a little discipline. I’ve often said to
colleagues that Gates would be better off if
he had finished Harvard.”
The District Judge likened Microsoft’s

writing of incriminating documents to
drug traffickers who “never figure out that
they shouldn’t be saying certain things on
the phone.” He invoked the drug trafficker
analogy again to denounce Microsoft’s
protestations of innocence, this time with
a reference to the notorious Newton Street
Crew that terrorized parts of Washington,
D.C. Reporter Auletta wrote in The New
Yorker that the Judge
went as far as to compare the
company’s declaration of innocence to the protestations of
gangland killers. He was referring to five gang members in a
racketeering, drug-dealing, and
murder trial that he had presided
over four years earlier. In that
case, the three victims had had
their heads bound with duct tape
before they were riddled with
bullets from semi-automatic
weapons. “On the day of the sentencing, the gang members maintained that they had done nothing wrong, saying that the whole
case was a conspiracy by the
white power structure to destroy
them,” Jackson recalled. “I am
now under no illusions that miscreants will realize that other
parts of society will view them
that way.”
[253 F.3d at 111] The District Judge
also secretly divulged to reporters his
views on the remedy for Microsoft’s
antitrust violations. On the question
whether Microsoft was entitled to any
process at the remedy stage, the Judge told
reporters in May 2000 that he was “not
aware of any case authority that says I
have to give them any due process at all.
The case is over. They lost.” Another
reporter has the Judge asking “were the
Japanese allowed to propose terms of their
surrender?” The District Judge also told
reporters the month before he issued his
break-up order that “[a]ssuming, as I
think they are, [] the Justice Department
and the states are genuinely concerned
about the public interest,” “I know they
have carefully studied all the possible
options. This isn’t a bunch of amateurs.
They have consulted with some of the best
minds in America over a long period of
time.” “I am not in a position to duplicate
that and re-engineer their work. There’s no
way I can equip myself to do a better job

than they have done.”
In February 2000, four months before
his final order splitting the company in
two, the District Judge reportedly told
New York Times reporters that he was “not
at all comfortable with restructuring the
company” because he was unsure
whether he was “competent to do that.”
A few months later, he had a change of
heart. He told the same reporters that
“with what looks like Microsoft intransigence, a breakup is inevitable.” The Judge
recited a “North Carolina mule trainer”
story to explain his change in thinking
from “if it ain’t broken, don’t try to fix it”
and “I just don’t think that [restructuring
the company] is something I want to try
to do on my own” to ordering Microsoft
broken in two:
He had a trained mule who could
do all kinds of wonderful tricks.
One day somebody asked him:
“How do you do it? How do you
train the mule to do all these
amazing things?” “Well,” he
answered, “I’ll show you.” He
took a 2-by-4 and whopped him
upside the head. The mule was
reeling and fell to his knees, and
the trainer said: “You just have to
get his attention.”
The Judge added: “I hope I’ve got
Microsoft’s attention.”
B. Violations of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges
The Code of Conduct for United States
Judges was adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States in 1973. It
prescribes ethical norms for federal judges
as a means to preserve the actual and
apparent integrity of the federal judiciary.
Every federal judge receives a copy of the
Code, the Commentary to the Code, the
Advisory Opinions of the Judicial
Conference’s Committee on Codes of
Conduct, and digests of the Committee’s
informal, unpublished opinions. See II
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (1973). The material is
periodically updated. Judges who have
questions about whether their conduct
would be consistent with the [253 F.3d at
112] Code may write to the Codes of
Conduct Committee for a written, confidential opinion. See Introduction, CODE OF
CONDUCT. The Committee traditionally
responds promptly. A judge may also seek

informal advice from the Committee’s circuit representative.
While some of the Code’s Canons frequently generate questions about their
application, others are straightforward
and easily understood. Canon 3A(6) is an
example of the latter. In forbidding federal judges to comment publicly “on the
merits of a pending or impending action,”
Canon 3A(6) applies to cases pending
before any court, state or federal, trial or
appellate. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 10.34, at
353 (3d ed. 2000). As “impending” indicates, the prohibition begins even before a
case enters the court system, when there
is reason to believe a case may be filed. Cf.
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 54 (1973). An
action remains “pending” until “completion of the appellate process.” CODE OF
CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) cmt.; Comm. on
Codes of Conduct, Adv. Op. No. 55
(1998).
The Microsoft case was “pending” during every one of the District Judge’s meetings with reporters; the case is “pending”
now; and even after our decision issues, it
will remain pending for some time. The
District Judge breached his ethical duty
under Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to
a reporter about the merits of the case.
Although the reporters interviewed him
in private, his comments were public.
Court was not in session and his discussion of the case took place outside the
presence of the parties. He provided his
views not to court personnel assisting him
in the case, but to members of the public.
And these were not just any members of
the public. Because he was talking to
reporters, the Judge knew his comments
would eventually receive widespread dissemination.
It is clear that the District Judge was
not discussing purely procedural matters,
which are a permissible subject of public
comment under one of the Canon’s three
narrowly drawn exceptions. He disclosed
his views on the factual and legal matters
at the heart of the case. His opinions
about the credibility of witnesses, the
validity of legal theories, the culpability of
the defendant, the choice of remedy, and
so forth all dealt with the merits of the
action. It is no excuse that the Judge may
have intended to “educate” the public
about the case or to rebut “public misperceptions” purportedly caused by the par-

ties. If those were his intentions, he could
have addressed the factual and legal issues
as he saw them—and thought the public
should see them—in his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Final Judgment, or in
a written opinion. Or he could have held
his tongue until all appeals were concluded.
Far from mitigating his conduct, the
District Judge’s insistence on secrecy—his
embargo—made matters worse. Concealment of the interviews suggests knowledge of their impropriety. Concealment
also prevented the parties from nipping
his improprieties in the bud. Without any
knowledge of the interviews, neither the
plaintiffs nor the defendant had a chance
to object or to seek the Judge’s removal
before he issued his Final Judgment.
Other federal judges have been disqualified for making limited public comments about cases pending before them.
See In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d
164 (1st Cir. 2001); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d
641 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cooley,
1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993). Given the [253
F.3d at 113] extent of the Judge’s transgressions in this case, we have little doubt
that if the parties had discovered his
secret liaisons with the press, he would
have been disqualified, voluntarily or by
court order. Cf. In re Barry, 292 U.S. App.
D.C. 39, 946 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(per curiam); 946 F.2d at 915 (Edwards,
J., dissenting).
In addition to violating the rule prohibiting public comment, the District
Judge’s reported conduct raises serious
questions under Canon 3A(4). That
Canon states that a “judge should accord
to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or the person’s lawyer,
full right to be heard according to law,
and, except as authorized by law, neither
initiate nor consider ex parte communications on the merits, or procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impending
proceeding.” CODE OF CONDUCT Canon
3A(4).
What did the reporters convey to the
District Judge during their secret sessions?
By one account, the Judge spent a total of
ten hours giving taped interviews to one
reporter. We do not know whether he
spent even more time in untaped conversations with the same reporter, nor do we
know how much time he spent with others. But we think it safe to assume that
these interviews were not monologues.
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Interviews often become conversations.
When reporters pose questions or make
assertions, they may be furnishing information, information that may reflect their
personal views of the case. The published
accounts indicate this happened on at
least one occasion. Ken Auletta reported,
for example, that he told the Judge “that
Microsoft employees professed shock that
he thought they had violated the law and
behaved unethically,” at which time the
Judge became “agitated” by “Microsoft’s
‘obstinacy’.” It is clear that Auletta had
views of the case. As he wrote in a
Washington Post editorial, “anyone who sat
in [the District Judge’s] courtroom during
the trial had seen ample evidence of
Microsoft’s sometimes thuggish tactics.”
The District Judge’s repeated violations
of Canons 3A(6) and 3A(4) also violated
Canon 2, which provides that “a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”
CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 2; see also In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 47 F.3d 399,
400 (10th Cir. Jud. Council 1995)(“The
allegations of extra-judicial comments
cause the Council substantial concern
under both Canon 3A(6) and Canon 2 of
the Judicial Code of Conduct.”). Canon
2A requires federal judges to “respect and
comply with the law” and to “act at all
times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” CODE OF CONDUCT
Canon 2A. The Code of Conduct is the
law with respect to the ethical obligations
of federal judges, and it is clear the
District Judge violated it on multiple
occasions in this case. The rampant disregard for the judiciary’s ethical obligations
that the public witnessed in this case
undoubtedly jeopardizes “public confidence in the integrity” of the District
Court proceedings.
Another point needs to be stressed.
Rulings in this case have potentially huge
financial consequences for one of the
nation’s largest publicly-traded companies
and its investors. The District Judge’s
secret interviews during the trial provided
a select few with inside information about
the case, information that enabled them
and anyone they shared it with to anticipate rulings before the Judge announced
them to the world. Although he “embargoed” his comments, the Judge had no
way of policing the reporters. For all he
knew there may have been trading on the
28 Court Review - Spring 2001

basis [253 F.3d at 114] of the information
he secretly conveyed. The public cannot
be expected to maintain confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the federal
judiciary in the face of such conduct.
C. Appearance of Partiality
The Code of Conduct contains no
enforcement mechanism. See THODE,
REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 43. The Canons, including the
one that requires a judge to disqualify
himself in certain circumstances, see CODE
OF CONDUCT Canon 3C, are self- enforcing.
There are, however, remedies extrinsic to
the Code. One is an internal disciplinary
proceeding, begun with the filing of a
complaint with the clerk of the court of
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
Another is disqualification of the offending judge under either 28 U.S.C. § 144,
which requires the filing of an affidavit
while the case is in the District Court, or
28 U.S.C. § 455, which does not.
Microsoft urges the District Judge’s disqualification under § 455(a): a judge
“shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The
standard for disqualification under §
455(a) is an objective one. The question is
whether a reasonable and informed
observer would question the judge’s
impartiality. See In re Barry, 946 F.2d at
914; see also In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194,
201 (2d Cir. 2001); RICHARD E. FLAMM,
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 24.2.1 (1996).
“The very purpose of § 455(a) is to
promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 865 (1988). As such, violations of
the Code of Conduct may give rise to a
violation of § 455(a) if doubt is cast on
the integrity of the judicial process. It has
been argued that any “public comment by
a judge concerning the facts, applicable
law, or merits of a case that is sub judice in
his court or any comment concerning the
parties or their attorneys would raise
grave doubts about the judge’s objectivity
and his willingness to reserve judgment
until the close of the proceeding.”
William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech:
Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 598 (1989). Some
courts of appeals have taken a hard line
on public comments, finding violations of

§ 455(a) for judicial commentary on
pending cases that seems mild in comparison to what we are confronting in this
case. See Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d
164 (granting writ of mandamus ordering
district judge to recuse herself under §
455(a) because of public comments on
class certification and standing in a pending case); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641
(granting writ of mandamus ordering district judge to recuse himself based in part
on the appearance of partiality caused by
his giving newspaper interviews); Cooley,
1 F.3d 985 (vacating convictions and disqualifying district judge for appearance of
partiality because he appeared on television program Nightline and stated that
abortion protestors in a case before him
were breaking the law and that his injunction would be obeyed).
While § 455(a) is concerned with
actual and apparent impropriety, the
statute requires disqualification only
when a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Although this court has condemned public judicial comments on pending cases,
we have not gone so far as to hold that
every violation of Canon 3A(6) or every
impropriety under the Code of Conduct
inevitably destroys the appearance of
impartiality and thus violates § 455(a).
See In re Barry, 946 F.2d at 914; see also
Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 168;
United States v. [253 F.3d at 115] Fortier,
242 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001).
In this case, however, we believe the
line has been crossed. The public comments were not only improper, but also
would lead a reasonable, informed
observer to question the District Judge’s
impartiality. Public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
is seriously jeopardized when judges
secretly share their thoughts about the
merits of pending cases with the press.
Judges who covet publicity, or convey the
appearance that they do, lead any objective observer to wonder whether their
judgments are being influenced by the
prospect of favorable coverage in the
media. Discreet and limited public comments may not compromise a judge’s
apparent impartiality, but we have little
doubt that the District Judge’s conduct
had that effect. Appearance may be all
there is, but that is enough to invoke the
Canons and § 455(a).
Judge Learned Hand spoke of “this

America of ours where the passion for
publicity is a disease, and where swarms
of foolish, tawdry moths dash with rapture into its consuming fire . . . .” LEARNED
HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 132-33 (2d
ed. 1953). Judges are obligated to resist
this passion. Indulging it compromises
what Edmund Burke justly regarded as
the “cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.” Cold or not, federal judges must
maintain the appearance of impartiality.
What was true two centuries ago is true
today: “Deference to the judgments and
rulings of courts depends upon public
confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.” CODE OF CONDUCT
Canon 1 cmt. Public confidence in judicial impartiality cannot survive if judges,
in disregard of their ethical obligations,
pander to the press.
We recognize that it would be extraordinary to disqualify a judge for bias or
appearance of partiality when his remarks
arguably reflected what he learned, or
what he thought he learned, during the
proceedings. See Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 554-55 (1994); United
States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). But this “extrajudicial source”
rule has no bearing on the case before us.
The problem here is not just what the
District Judge said, but to whom he said it
and when. His crude characterizations of
Microsoft, his frequent denigrations of
Bill Gates, his mule trainer analogy as a
reason for his remedy—all of these
remarks and others might not have given
rise to a violation of the Canons or of §
455(a) had he uttered them from the
bench. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56;
CODE OF CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) (exception to prohibition on public comments
for “statements made in the course of the
judge’s official duties”). But then
Microsoft would have had an opportunity
to object, perhaps even to persuade, and
the Judge would have made a record for
review on appeal. It is an altogether different matter when the statements are
made outside the courtroom, in private
meetings unknown to the parties, in
anticipation that ultimately the Judge’s
remarks would be reported. Rather than
manifesting neutrality and impartiality,
the reports of the interviews with the
District Judge convey the impression of a
judge posturing for posterity, trying to
please the reporters with colorful analogies and observations bound to wind up

in the stories they write. Members of the
public may reasonably question whether
the District Judge’s desire for press coverage influenced his judgments, indeed
whether a publicity-seeking judge might
consciously or subconsciously seek the
publicity-maximizing outcome. We
believe, therefore, that the District Judge’s
interviews with reporters created an
appearance that he was not acting impartially, [253 F.3d at 116] as the Code of
Conduct and § 455(a) require.
D. Remedies for Judicial Misconduct
and Appearance of Partiality
1. DISQUALIFICATION
Disqualification is mandatory for conduct that calls a judge’s impartiality into
question. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); In re
School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 783
(3d Cir. 1992). Section 455 does not prescribe the scope of disqualification.
Rather, Congress “delegated to the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies
that will best serve the purpose” of the
disqualification statute. Liljeberg, 486
U.S. at 862.
At a minimum, § 455(a) requires
prospective disqualification of the offending judge, that is, disqualification from
the judge’s hearing any further proceedings in the case. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-65
(D.C. Cir. 1995)(per curiam)(“Microsoft
I”). Microsoft urges retroactive disqualification of the District Judge, which would
entail disqualification antedated to an earlier part of the proceedings and vacatur of
all subsequent acts. Cf. In re School
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 786 (discussing
remedy options).
“There need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a).”
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. Liljeberg held
that a district judge could be disqualified
under § 455(a) after entering final judgment in a case, even though the judge was
not (but should have been) aware of the
grounds for disqualification before final
judgment. The Court identified three factors relevant to the question whether
vacatur is appropriate: “in determining
whether a judgment should be vacated for
a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to
consider the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, the risk that the
denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and the risk of undermining

the public’s confidence in the judicial
process.” Id. at 864. Although the Court
was discussing § 455(a) in a slightly different context (the judgment there had
become final after appeal and the movant
sought to have it vacated under Rule
60(b)), we believe the test it propounded
applies as well to cases such as this in
which the full extent of the disqualifying
circumstances came to light only while
the appeal was pending. See In re School
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 785.
Our application of Liljeberg leads us to
conclude that the appropriate remedy for
the violations of § 455(a) is disqualification of the District Judge retroactive only
to the date he entered the order breaking
up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate
that order in its entirety and remand this
case to a different District Judge, but will
not set aside the existing Findings of Fact
or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as
specific findings are clearly erroneous or
legal conclusions are incorrect).
This partially retroactive disqualification minimizes the risk of injustice to the
parties and the damage to public confidence in the judicial process. Although
the violations of the Code of Conduct and
§ 455(a) were serious, full retroactive disqualification is unnecessary. It would
unduly penalize plaintiffs, who were
innocent and unaware of the misconduct,
and would have only slight marginal
deterrent effect.
Most important, full retroactive disqualification is unnecessary to protect
Microsoft’s right to an impartial adjudication. The District Judge’s conduct
destroyed the appearance of impartiality.
Microsoft neither alleged nor demonstrated that it rose to the level of actual
bias or prejudice. There is no reason to
presume that everything the District
Judge did is suspect. [253 F.3d at 117] See
In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 974, 97576 (1st Cir. 1989); cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v.
Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1301-02
(D.C. Cir. 1988). Although Microsoft
challenged very few of the findings as
clearly erroneous, we have carefully
reviewed the entire record and discern no
basis to suppose that actual bias infected
his factual findings.
The most serious judicial misconduct
occurred near or during the remedial
stage. It is therefore commensurate that
our remedy focus on that stage of the
case. The District Judge’s impatience with
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what he viewed as intransigence on the
part of the company; his refusal to allow
an evidentiary hearing; his analogizing
Microsoft to Japan at the end of World
War II; his story about the mule—all of
these out-of-court remarks and others,
plus the Judge’s evident efforts to please
the press, would give a reasonable,
informed observer cause to question his
impartiality in ordering the company split
in two.
To repeat, we disqualify the District
Judge retroactive only to the imposition of
the remedy, and thus vacate the remedy
order for the reasons given in Section V
and because of the appearance of partiality
created by the District Judge’s misconduct.
2. REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Given the limited scope of our disqualification of the District Judge, we have let
stand for review his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The severity of the
District Judge’s misconduct and the
appearance of partiality it created have led
us to consider whether we can and should
subject his factfindings to greater scrutiny.
For a number of reasons we have rejected
any such approach.
The Federal Rules require that district
court findings of fact not be set aside
unless they are clearly erroneous. See FED
R. CIV. P. 52(a). Ordinarily, there is no
basis for doubting that the District Court’s
factual findings are entitled to the substantial deference the clearly erroneous
standard entails. But of course this is no
ordinary case. Deference to a district
court’s factfindings presumes impartiality
on the lower court’s part. When impartiality is called into question, how much deference is due?
The question implies that there is some
middle ground, but we believe there is
none. As the rules are written, district
court factfindings receive either full deference under the clearly erroneous standard
or they must be vacated. There is no de
novo appellate review of factfindings and
no intermediate level between de novo and
clear error, not even for findings the court
of appeals may consider sub-par. See
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 228
(1988)(“The District Court’s lack of precision, however, is no excuse for the Court
of Appeals to ignore the dictates of Rule
30 Court Review - Spring 2001

52(a) and engage in impermissible appellate factfinding.”); Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-75
(1985)(criticizing district court practice
of adopting a party’s proposed factfindings
but overturning court of appeals’ application of “close scrutiny” to such findings).
Rule 52(a) mandates clearly erroneous
review of all district court factfindings:
“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The
rule “does not make exceptions or purport
to exclude certain categories of factual
findings from the obligation of a court of
[253 F.3d at 118] appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 287 (1982); see also Anderson,
470 U.S. at 574-75; Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855-58
(1982). The Supreme Court has emphasized on multiple occasions that “in applying the clearly erroneous standard to the
findings of a district court sitting without
a jury, appellate courts must constantly
have in mind that their function is not to
decide factual issues de novo.” Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Anderson, 470 U.S.
at 573 (quoting Zenith).
The mandatory nature of Rule 52(a)
does not compel us to accept factfindings
that result from the District Court’s misapplication of governing law or that otherwise do not permit meaningful appellate review. See Pullman-Standard, 456
U.S. at 292; Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 855
n.15. Nor must we accept findings that
are utterly deficient in other ways. In such
a case, we vacate and remand for further
factfinding. See 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 52.12[1] (Matthew Bender 3d
ed. 2000); 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2577, at 514-22 (2d ed.
1995); cf.
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v.
Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986);
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 291-92.
When there is fair room for argument
that the District Court’s factfindings
should be vacated in toto, the court of
appeals should be especially careful in
determining that the findings are worthy

of the deference Rule 52(a) prescribes.
See, e.g., Thermo Electron Corp. v.
Schiavone Constr. Co., 915 F.2d 770, 773
(1st Cir. 1990); cf.
Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). Thus, although
Microsoft alleged only appearance of bias,
not actual bias, we have reviewed the
record with painstaking care and have discerned no evidence of actual bias. See S.
Pac. Communications Co. v. AT & T, 740
F.2d 980, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cooley, 1
F.3d at 996 (disqualifying district judge
for appearance of partiality but noting
that “the record of the proceedings below
. . . discloses no bias”).
In light of this conclusion, the District
Judge’s factual findings both warrant deference under the clear error standard of
review and, though exceedingly sparing
in citations to the record, permit meaningful appellate review. In reaching these
conclusions, we have not ignored the
District Judge’s reported intention to craft
his factfindings and Conclusions of Law
to minimize the breadth of our review.
The Judge reportedly told Ken Auletta
that “what I want to do is confront the
Court of Appeals with an established factual record which is a fait accompli.” He
explained: “part of the inspiration for
doing that is that I take mild offense at
their reversal of my preliminary injunction in the consent-decree case, where
they went ahead and made up about
ninety percent of the facts on their own.”
Id. Whether the District Judge takes
offense, mild or severe, is beside the
point. Appellate decisions command
compliance, not agreement. We do not
view the District Judge’s remarks as anything other than his expression of disagreement with this court’s decision, and
his desire to provide extensive factual
findings in this case, which he did.
VII. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and [253
F.3d at 119] remanded in part. We vacate
in full the Final Judgment embodying the
remedial order, and remand the case to the
District Court for reassignment to a different trial judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LETTERS
More on Impending Proceedings
In his reply to my commentary on Free Speech for Judges
(Winter 2001), Professor Steven Lubet misquotes my proposal.
Making my proposal appear more restrictive on judicial
speech than it is in fact, Professor Lubet says: “Professor
Freedman’s own proposal sweeps much more broadly, as it
would apply to all ‘issues’ in a ‘contested case,’ and not merely
to identifiable, impending proceedings.”
Actually, my proposed rule would apply only if there is a
reasonable possibility that the same “issue [discussed by the
judge] will be contested” in a case that will come before the
judge. Thus, to take Professor Lubet’s illustration, it is possible that perjury cases will come before Judge Posner, but it is
exceedingly unlikely that the same issue of materiality presented in President Clinton’s case will be contested in a case
before Judge Posner.
Monroe H. Freedman
Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor
of Legal Ethics
Hofstra University School of Law
Hempstead, New York
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Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will consider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline. In addition to the outline, a comment about the specific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
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NEW BOOKS
STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH:
WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T, AND
SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE
TRUTH. New York Univ. Press, 2001.
($38). 198 pp.
We have to admit that we started out
rooting for this book even before we
knew what it was about. After all,
Steven Lubet is both a member of Court
Review’s editorial board and a frequent
contributor. Then we learned that the
book was a essentially a defense of the
way trials are conducted in the
American legal system, the very place
many of us spend most of our working
lives. After getting the book and reading it, we’re pretty sure most judges
would both enjoy it and find its comments intriguing.
To be sure, Lubet’s hero is the trial
lawyer, not the trial judge. But he has
written a book that is so clearly
grounded in the realities of the trial
process that anyone who has spent
time there will find many moments of
recognition.
Many judges, no doubt, have from
time to time been tempted to think—
as do many in the public at large—that
trials are as far from a search for truth
as one could get. (These thoughts are
most apt to come on a day in which
inept lawyers have taken positions on
both sides of the courtroom.) Lubet
contends, however, that the purposive
storytelling engaged in by good
lawyers is the key to the success of the
adversary system. In a brief introduction, he explains the importance of
having a case theory and theme; he
also contends that the “story frame”
may be the most important element.
For example, he notes that the prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson case used a
domestic violence story frame, hoping
that jurors would view events in that
context, while the defense used a
police prejudice story frame, advanc32 Court Review - Spring 2001

ing the theory that officers must have
contrived or mishandled the evidence
against Simpson.
Lubet then explores what he calls
the messy process of getting to the
truth at trial by focusing on several
cases, both real and fictional. He
includes John Brown and Wyatt Earp,
as well as Liberty Valance and Atticus
Finch. In each of the seven chapters,
he develops his theme against both the
record of these actual or fictional trials
and the contexts in which they arose.
As Lubet notes, and most of us who
have endured long trials would agree,
“More facts produce less clarity.”
Thus, a good trial lawyer does a service
to the search for truth by organizing
the narratives, including facts that fit
and omitting those that do not, so that
the trier of fact can form conclusions
about what happened. If, on a bad day,
you find yourself having doubts about
“the system,” this is the book to pick
up and read.
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Public Trust & Confidence Update

http://www.ncsc.dni.us/PTC.HTM
In May 1999, the National Conference
on Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System brought together over 500
representatives of the bench, bar, and
public to address the state of public confidence in the courts. The fall 1999 issue of
Court Review included all the major presentations given during the conference
and an overview of the emerging national
action plan to improve public trust.
During the conference, United States
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor told attendees that “the measure of this conference will be what happens when you return home, what you do
about the conclusions and ideas discussed
here.” Based on a recent survey of public
trust and confidence activities, many
states continue to work diligently to
improve court performance and enhance

public trust. The 1999 conference identified 15 issues that contribute to low trust
and confidence. At least a few states are
working on each issue. A majority are
focusing on issues related to judicial isolation, lack of public understanding, and
poor customer relations with the public.
Several states also are concentrating on
the conference’s top-priority issues of
unequal treatment in—and the high cost
of access to—the justice system. For
more information on each state’s efforts
and on the national action plan to
improve public trust and confidence, visit
the online forum on public trust and confidence in the justice system at the website address listed above.
U.S. v. Microsoft Update

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/
legalnews.asp
h t t p : / / w w w. u s d o j . g o v / a t r / c a s e s /
ms_index.htm
In our Winter 2001 issue, we reprinted
portions of the appellate briefs in the
Microsoft antitrust case. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has
now agreed with Microsoft’s argument
that the trial judge’s extensive contacts
with the media were improper (see the
Focus section noted below). As this issue
went to press, Microsoft had filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court based solely on the
trial court misconduct issue. The websites
listed above contain most of the court
pleadings filed in the case both by
Microsoft and by the United States
Department of Justice.
FOCUS ON THE
MICROSOFT CASE
In the Resource Page Focus section last
issue, we presented the briefs on appeal in
the Microsoft antitrust case dealing with
the trial judges’ conduct. We didn’t know
at that time whether the appellate court
would find this issue of importance in
deciding the appeal. It did, and we have
reprinted the appellate court’s views in
this issue, beginning at page 25.

